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KENTUCKY RULE AS TO TACKING INTERESTS IN
ADVERSE POSSESSION
An adverse possession may ripen into title when such posses-
sion is open, notorious, exclusive, hostile, continuous and unin-
terrupted for the full statutory period of fifteen years in Ken-
tucky.1 It is not necessary that an adverse possession should
be maintained for the statutory period by one person. How-
ever, before successive possessions can be tacked, there must
exist a privity of estate or connection of title between the several
occupants. This was early decided (1831) in the case of Winn
v. Wilhite.2 Chief Justice Robertson in delivering the opinion
of the court said, "It is not necessary that it (possession) should
have continued in one person, or in the same right. But it must
have been adverse throughout, and when held by different per-
sons, there must be some privity between them."
The entry of the succeeding odcupant must be with the
consent of his predecessor, evidenced by a conveyance or under-
standing the purpose of which is to transfer the rights and
possession of the adverse claimant, or it must be by an act of
law passing the estate from the latter to the former. The trans-
fer must be accomplished by an actual delivery of possession.
The moment the possession is broken it ceases to be effectual be-
cause, as soon and as often as a break occurs, the law restores
the constructive possession of the owner.3 The cases of McKee
v. Morgan4 and Braxdale v. Speed5 decided in 1817 are decisive
on this point.
The court in the course of its opinion in the latter case said
that the person claiming the title by adverse possession must
show continued, uninterrupted possession for the statutory
period, and that occasional acts of£ ownership as cutting of timber
upon the land would not amount to such continued possession
and occupancy.
In Shannon v. Kinney,6 a younger brother of the patentee,
entered after the patentee had been killed by Indians and settled
'Kentucky Statutes, See. 2505.
25 J. J. Marsh. 521.
3 A. K. Marsh. 365.
41 A. K. Marsh. 62.
1 A. K. Marsh. 105.
1 A. K. Marsh. 3.
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on the land claiming it as his own, and remained there twenty
years, then surrendered the possession to the defendant, who had
not had the land in possessioi for the required statutory period
prior to the commencement of the suit. Under this state of facts
the right of entry was tolled. "Nor can it, in the reason and
nature of things, produce any difference whether the possession
be held uniformly under one title or at different times under
different titles, provided the claim of title be always adverse to
that of the plaintiff, nor whether the same be held by the same or
a succession of individuals provided the possession be a con-
tinued and uninterrupted one." And in Bowles v. Sharp,7 the
question as to holding under color of title was answered by the
Court of Appeals in the following language: "Nor is it neces-
sary that an adverse possession should be held under color of
title, in order to render it transferable; for a mere intruder,
abator, or dissesor may transfer his possession."
In the late case of Arthur v. Humble8 the Court held that
when a squatter on land removed therefrom, the same amounted
to an abandonment of his possession, and whatever benefit ac-
crued under it could not be seized upon by a stranger in title to
him, nor be coupled by the stranger to his possession so that fif-
teen years of the two combined could oust the title of the true
owner. In this instance there was no writing or memorandum of
a conveyance from the squatter to the claimant; and in the
absence of such, there could have been no sale of the squatter's
"possession." Soon after the decision in this case, the Court of
Appeals was called upon to render a decision in White v. Mc-
NaWbb involving, in addition to other -points, the main point of
contention that had been before the court in Arthur v. Humble.
The appellees in an action of ejectment claimed a certain five
acre tract of land on which there was a coal bank, and from
which they had dug coal over a period of twenty years. The ap-
pellants had been in possession for five or six years prior to the
commencement of the suit. In reversing the decision of the lower
court, the Court of Appeals made use of the following language:
"To acquire title in this manner (by adverse possession) the ad-
verse possession must not only be actual, but so continued as to
74 Bibb. 550.
8 140 Ky. 56, 130 S. W. 958.
9 140 Ky. 828, 131 S. W. 1021.
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have furnished a cause of action every day during the whole
period. Different and distinct periods of possession can not be
added to constitute a bar." However, "Possession to toll a right
of entry need not be continued in the same person nor under the
same title for the whole time." Riddle v. MeBee.'0
In addition to the privity of estate that must of neccesity
exist between those persons holding successive possessions
there is a further requirement. This is specially noted
in Hughes v. Owens." "It is not necessary only that the claim-
ant should have been in adverse possession of the boundary for
fifteen years, but that this possession was adverse, open and con-
tinuous to a well defined marked boundary."
The decision in the early case of Winn v. Wilhite, supra,
has been generally followed. Quoting further from that case:
"A trespasser without color of title can only count his own pos-
session, and can not connect himself with any prior possessor."
In the case of Griffithb v. Dicken,1 2 where the adverse possession
set up by the defendant lacked two days of having run the stat-
utory period, it was held that the right of entry was not tolled
since the defendant, having entered as tenant when the land was
vacant, could not connect his possession with any previous ten-
ancy which had ceased when he entered. And in Bell v. Fry, 13
the court held that the five or six years' adverse possession of the
defendant could not be tacked to the sixteen years prior posses-
sion of squatters. The latter held under the legal title, and their
possession inured to its benefit. The instant the squatters left,
the law restored the constructive possession of the owner of
the legal title.
In the case of BeaZ v. Brooks,1 4 where the defendant wished
to tack his five years' possession to the seventeen years' posses-
sion of his ancestor, who was a vendee under an executory con-
tract, the court in holding said that "..... no man should
be permitted to buy up the claim of the vendee of land holding
under an executory contract; and by so doing, convert the
- 4 Ky. L. R. 898.
29 Ky. L. R. 140, 92 S. W. 595.
124 Dana. 561.
5 Dana. 341.
2 7 J. J. Marsh. 232.
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friendly possession subsisting between the vendor and vendee
into a possession adverse to the vendor's rights."
In Boark v. Reed,15 the appellee, though unable to show a
paper title to the land that he had bought at an execution sale
ten years prior, was permitted to tack the thirty years adverse
possession of his vendor to that of his own and thus establish
his title.1 6 In Mills v. Bodley,17 there were conflicting patents,
the complainant claiming under a valid junior patent. The
ancestor had entered under the senior patent and died leaving
his widow and children in possession. The complainant agreed
not to disturb the widow. However, she did not acknowledge
that the land belonged to the complainant. It was adjudged
that the residence of the ancestor, and the continued occupancy
of the widow could be tacked and of this the heirs could avail
themselves. The court here remarked: "We are not disposed
to admit that the widow had the right to convert the adverse
possession into a friendly one, without their (the heirs') con-
currence, so as to prevent them from relying on a lapse of time
as a bar to relief against their title." The case of Tippenhauer
v. Tippenhauer,:8 decided in 1914, involved a similar question.
In the much cited case of Botts v. Shields,19 where the
appellant entered upon the land in controversy under a claim
adverse to both the junior and senior patentees, and later con-
tracted with one of the junior patentee's heirs for the claim of
the junior patentee, the court ruled that the contract ought not
to be construed to convert the appellant into a tenant of the
heirs, or give to the heirs the benefit of the original possession
of the appellant, the same being adverse to their claim.
Actual possession on a part of the land not covered by a
senior patent can not be tacked so as to cover the land included
within the interfering patent without an actual occupancy of it.
"The only way a title may be acquired by the patentee of the
interfering patent tb the land covered by the lap is by an
actual occupancy of it, claiming it to well defined and marked
15148 Ky. 172, 146 S. W. 1.
See also Jarboe v. MeAtee, 7 B. Mon. 279.
174 T. B. Mon. 248.
155 Ky. 639, 166 S. W. 225.
3 Litt. 32.
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boundaries continuously and adversely for the statutory period
of fifteen years."
'20
Several cases have recently come before the Qourt of
Appeals directly involving the question under discussion, and
the opinions in these cases with the rules enunciated in the ear-
lier cases have assisted in removing any doubt as to the present
state of the law in Kentucky.
In Big Blaine Oil & Gas Company v. Yates,21 decided in
1918, was a case where the husband deserted his wife and chil-
dren, and a tract of fifty acres of land was entered upon by the
oldest son. This son held for five or six years, then sold to his
mother, who remained upon the tract until her death. The
court here held that the wife as transferee from an adverse
holder could hold the land adversely to her husband, and that
title would become perfect if the character of her occupancy
was such as to be adverse, -and it with that of her transferor
completed the statutory period. While in Sackett v. Jeffries,
22
decided in 1919, where there were several periods of a year or
less when the appellant and his predecessors did not have the
actual possession of the land in controversy, or any part thereof,
during the period of fifteen years upon which he relied for the
perfection of his title, the court said: "Possession must not only
be actual but it must be open, notorius, continuous, adverse and
peaceful for every hour of every day of the whole .fifteen year
period. . . . Different and distinct periods of possession
can not be tacked to establish a bar so as to constitute title by
adverse possession." In Osborn v. Roberts,2 3 also' decided in
1919, the defendants were not permitted to tack a prior posses-
sion of their father to an adverse possession of their own. They
had entered the land in controversy in the absence of the plain-
tiff and raised two crops of corn, and claimed the land by
adverse possession for the statutory period by a prior possession
of their father. Here it is shown that whatever possession
and claim of title the father had of the land were by written
agreement relinquished by him to the plaintiff's vendor about
seven years before the suit was filed, and following this re-
"173 Ky. 220, 190 S. W. 1063.
2182 Ky. 45, 190 S. W. 1062.
2182 Ky. 696, 207 S. W. 454.
" 186 Ky. 160, 216 S. W. 359.
144 KMucoY LAw JouNAL.
linquishment by their father, the land was not inclosed and
grew up in bushes. The court held in this instance that there
was a "break in continuity, within the statutory period."
It is readily seen from the decisions in the above cases, which
decisions have been repeatedly followed by the highest court of
many of our sister states, that the fundamental question of law
involving the tacking of possessions in order to complete the
statutory period of adverse possession, have been settled with
a certainty that should leave little doubt as to the future hold-
ings of the Court of Appeals.
H. H. GROOMS.
Attorney at Law,
Birmingham, Ala.
